At the third BRICS summit on Hainan Island in 2011, Russian president Dmitri Medvedev claimed that the BRICS countries -with the adhesion of South Africa -now included the 'biggest states of three continents' (Rossiiskaya gazeta, 15 April 2011, p. 2). But it was much less clear that these five countries represented a sustainable model of political development over the medium or longer term. All of the countries have displayed increasing economic inequality over the past half century, while only one-India-could be classed as a mature, stable democracy. The papers in this special section focus on the two largest, most populous and least democratic of the BRICS, Russia and China, to examine the impact of economic inequality on their political trajectories.
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The statistics detailing the socioeconomic growth of Russia and China are impressive. Taken together, the two countries account for 41 per cent of the total territory of the BRICs, and for 51 per cent of their total population and 63 per cent of their GDP. On Goldman Sachs (2007) projections, by 2050 China is slated to be the world's largest economy, and Russia was to be its sixth largest.
Despite this impressive record of economic growth, a striking feature of both countries is the non-egalitarian nature of their development -notwithstanding the (post)communist legacy. On most conventional measures, these two countries are now among the most unequal in the world. According to Russian official statistics, the decile ratio rose from 4 in 1990 to 16.5 in 2010, and the Gini coefficient from .26 to .42 2 ; the best estimates of Chinese Gini coefficients indicate a very similar rise, from .26 in 1983 -just after the introduction of the contract responsibility system -to .49 in 2012 (Chen et al. 2010, p. 20; Wildau & Mitchell 2016) .
The widening of income inequalities has been an international phenomenon; but according to the United Nations 2010 Human Development Report, it has been 'especially marked in the countries that were part of the former Soviet Union' (p. 72). On their figures, Gini coefficients were already higher in Russia than in the United Kingdom, and higher in China than in the United States. One consequence was that both countries were increasingly well represented on Forbes' list of the world's billionaires: in the 2011 list China doubled its representation to 115 (which took it to second place) and Russia was in third place with 101; there were more billionaires in Moscow at this time than in any other city in the world (Izvestiya, 11 March 2011, pp. 1, 3) .
What effect does such endemic economic inequality have on political stability? Aristotle pointed out in his Politics that 'when men are equal they are contented'. He drew particular attention to the people of Tarentum, who, 'by sharing the use of their own property with the poor, [gained] their good will'.
Accordingly, 'democracy appears to be safer and less liable to revolution than oligarchy' (Everson 1996, pp. 132, 160, 121 (Lindsay 1964, pp. 282, 285, 283) .
The relationship between economic inequality and political instability in 
Political Instability in Russia and China
The evidence suggests that economic inequality in Russia and China is both substantial and increasing. Official statistics are always subject to political manipulation-as was the case when Russia increased its official count of 'the poor' by more than 2 million in early 2011 to take account of the evidence of the 2010 census (Kommersant, 4 July 2011, p. 3) . There is however a substantial literature that can help us identify some of the shortcomings in official data and supplement them with independent estimates. 3 For example, the Higher School of Economics has developed a comprehensive 'index of wellbeing' which shows that living standards for 40 per cent of the population are still below where they were at the end of the communist period, as if 'two countries' existed in parallel (Kukol 2011) .
In China, household income and expenditure surveys have generally confirmed that economic disparities have been increasing not only in monetary terms, but also across households and regions and between urban and rural areas Chen et al. 2010; Liu 2010) . 4 Despite attempts to enhance welfare programs, the main thrust of the recent reforms has been to reduce or even eliminate the 'iron rice bowl' approach to social protection. The social programs that have replaced them leave much of the population with scant protection in the event of sickness, old age or disability (Li and Zhong 2009; Duckett 2007 Duckett , 2011 . For China, too, it is widely accepted that political power has enabled Communist Party (CCP) cadres and government officials to benefit disproportionately from economic growth (Goodman 2008) . While government officials did not benefit from 'nomenklatura privatisation' in the same way as their Russian counterparts, they or their children had opportunities to acquire shares in state businesses (a notable phenomenon has been the children of officials engaging in business and in so doing benefitting from their parents' political capital). For this and other reasons, current scholarship inclines towards the view that economic growth and marketisation are unlikely to lead to the emergence of new elites that might challenge the regime (Dickson 2003 (Dickson , 2008 ).
This conclusion is based on an examination of the CCP's organisation and structure, its corporatist strategy of developing business associations, the logic of co-option, the CCP's strategy of adaptation in the light of lessons drawn from the Soviet collapse (see also Shambaugh 2008; Munro 2008) , and surveys of entrepreneurs themselves.
5
The sustainability of authoritarian politics of a Russian or Chinese kind has been placed in doubt by sustained, high level economic growth. A rich and still-influential social science literature associated particularly with Lipset (1959) has suggested that rising levels of GDP will of themselves undermine authoritarian politics: societies will become more complex, professionals will increasingly combine to advance their own interests, and 'cross-cutting cleavages' will predispose political actors towards bargaining and accommodation rather than zero-sum confrontation. For some (e.g. Pye 1990), the changes that had taken place in Eastern Europe were indeed a demonstration of the explanatory power of modernization theories of this kind; but in the Russian case, its political system was actually more authoritarian in 2011 than it had been at the end of the Soviet period. Will postcommunist authoritarianism in Russia be undermined by a stilldeveloping society?
In 
Overview of the Special Issue
The articles that follow examine these themes from several different perspectives. While the central question concerns the implications of economic inequality for political stability, several papers approach the question from the perspective of institutions, while other papers use a range of public opinion data.
Cook and Dimitrov adopt the former approach, and use social contract theory to explain political stability in communist autocracies. They argue that this stability is a consequence of an implicit exchange between the regime and the populace:
citizens remain quiescent so long as the regime provides them with secure jobs, social services, subsidised housing and consumer goods. Cook and Dimitrov ask how well the social contract thesis applies in three different types of regimes.
First, they examine the socialist social contract in light of newly available archival evidence on the Soviet Union. Second, they examine the social contract in reform-era China and, third, in Putin's Russia. They conclude that postsocialist regimes create distinctive 'market social contracts'. More specifically, communist and authoritarian leaders cater to the consumption needs of their populations in a strategic effort to remain in office.
In rapidly expanding economies, the population shift from the country to the city creates particular tensions. This topic is examined by Danilova, who compares social inequality in Russia and China and how it is perceived by the urban population. The evidence comes from representative surveys of the adult population in two major cities, Shanghai and St Petersburg, using a strictly In the Russian case this includes Shkaratan (2009) and Tikhonova (2011) as well as numerous studies by Zaslavskaya (e.g. 2004) and Rimashevskaya (e.g. 2007) .
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Major contributions include Whyte (2010a), Wang (2008) , Bian (2002) and Khan and Riskin (2001) , as well as edited collections by Davis and Wang (2009), Wan (2008) , and Shue and Wong (2007) .
5
Similar arguments concerning China's new rich have been presented by Tsai (2007) and Chen (2002) .
